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York: Remedies

Remedies
by Kenneth H. York*
This article will cover the remedial aspects of civil cases,
and as such will mention several decisions which are reviewed
elsewhere in this volume in a substantive law context. It
will concentrate upon the California courts' application of
various legal remedies (principally damages), equitable remedies (including the existence of equitable jurisdiction), and
restitutionary remedies (both legal and equitable) with some
reference to the substantive elements needed for restitution.
Choice of Tort, Contract or Restitution-Remedial Consequences
The remedial goals of compensatory damages for tortious
wrongs differ from those of breach of contract-and both
differ from the goal of restitution which may be alternatively
sought. There are many instances of a plaintiff being allowed
* A.B. 1937, LL.B. 1941, University
of Colorado. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
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a choice of substantive theory for remedial advantage; examples include the routine waiver of the tort in favor of quasicontract to obtain the advantage of attachment, or the choice
of damages or rescission in warranty and deceit cases. The
joint venturer (in a land development arrangement), barred
from a breach of contract action against his co-venturer short
of an equitable accounting suit, may quite properly turn to
a fraud count, as in Boyd v. Bevilacqua,! and recover damages
for tort under the broad provisions of sections 3333 and 1709
of the California Civil Code, rather than under the "out of
pocket" limitations of section 3343 applicable to the vendorvendee relationship. To avoid this supposed "out of pocket"
limitation on compensatory damages for deceit, the California
Supreme Court, in Ward v. Taggert,2 allowed the plaintiff to
choose between tort and restitution theories and thus pursue
disparate remedial goals with concomitant advantages. Without quarreling with the propriety of permitting an aggrieved
party to take his choice of substantive rights, it should be
pointed out that while tort-con tract-restitution distinctions
may be obscured, they cannot be remedially erased. Ward v.
Taggert has spawned a line of decisions in which tort damages
(properly or improperly) are disguised under a "constructive
trust-unjust enrichment-quasi contract" rubric which applies
to nothing of substance in the case. 3
Another remedial problem created by permissive tendencies toward plaintiff's substantive law choices is the necessity
of placing some fences around the playgrounds. In the familiar situation where the plaintiff is permitted either to affirm
a fraudulent contract and sue for damages for deceit or to
disaffirm and take restitution, certain rules have been developed (albeit shaky ones) on forcing the inevitable election.
Whenever the choice of substantive theory is extended into
novel situations, similar guidelines should be laid down for
the edification of the profession and the protection of defendants from undue harassment.
1. 247 Cal. App.2d 272, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1966).
2. 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534
(1959).
284
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Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 4 is a decision in point.
The impact of this decision on the insurance industry is discussed elsewhere in this volume, and only the remedial implications are of concern here. The wrong committed was the
refusal of a liability insurer to settle within the policy limits,
where the ensuing trial resulted in a judgment against the
insured in excess of those limits. Several years ago, in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance CO.,5 a claim based on
the same wrong was allowed as a contractual one for purposes
of assignability and the statute of limitations. Intervening
cases 6 assumed the claim to sound in contract, and the lower
court in Crisci, acting on this assumption, ruled out a $25,000
claim for mental distress. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court made it clear that the plaintiff could elect a tort theory
and reinstated the claim for mental anguish. This is all well
and good, but the plaintiff cannot have it both ways at the
same time, and an election must be compelled at some stage.
Even an insurance company is entitled to know when.
A similar problem may be developing with respect to cases
on "wrongful life," as to remedial possibilities derived from
a permitted choice of substantive theories. These cases involve sterilization operations followed by unexpected pregnancies. 7

Restitution-General Application
Restitution for unjust enrichment is a simple, but on occasion a most puzzling and complicated, notion. It has emerged
as a well-recognized branch of legal learning and its standard
usages are sufficiently well defined to permit the treatment
of restitutionary remedies within the topical organization of
this article as it develops. As a very broadly based concept
with a frank appeal to natural justice, restitution also lends
itself very readily to application in unusual situations, and
4. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
426 P.2d 173 (1967). For further discussion of this case, see Seligson, Insura nee, in this volume.
5. 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68
ALR2d 883 (1958).

6. See, e.g., Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal. App.2d 788, 41
Cal. Rptr. 401, 12 ALR3d 1142 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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California courts have shown a commendable willingness to
use this flexible device to come up with a remedy in litigation
that lacks decisional precedent.
Prof. John P. Dawson in his book, Unjust Enrichment,S
mentions a case decided in France-"The great case of June
15, 1892
[which] created a great sensation." A
French farmer, a tenant of the defendant, had bought fertilizer
from the plaintiff, who remained unpaid. After application
of the fertilizer to the land, the lease was canceled because
of the farmer's default and the defendant took possession.
The farmer was insolvent, so the plaintiff sued the defendant
directly for the benefit received from the application of the
fertilizer to the land of the defendant. We quote from Prof.
Dawson:
So far it was not a great extension beyond [an] 1864
case . . . of seed sold to a farmer, with other facts
the same. There was one important difference, however; the Code gave a preferential claim on the proceeds
of crops to suppliers of seeds, but not to suppliers of
fertilizer.
From seeds to fertilizer may be a
short step across the barn, but it was a high dive for the
Court of Cassation. For the Court, in refusing to reverse
the lower court's judgment for the purchase price of the
fertilizer, declared that the judgment did not falsely
apply 'the principles of the actio de in rem verso.' By
this simple phrase it elevated the principle of unjust enrichment to a rank beside the Code.
9
On September 22, 1967 the California Court of Appeal
(Fifth District) decided a case, Kossian v. American National
Insurance Co./o which is not going to cause a great sensation,
but is nonetheless interesting by comparison. When the
Bakersfield Inn burned down it left a pile of litigation as
well as debris. The owner hired the plaintiff to clean up
the debris for $18,900. The work was performed but the
8. Dawson,
(1951).
9. Dawson,
p. 101 (1951).
~8~
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10. 254 Cal. App.2d 694, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1967).

CAL LAW 1967

4

York: Remedies

Remedies

owner went bankrupt. The defendant was the beneficiary
of a trust deed on the premises. The trustee in bankruptcy
abandoned the premises to the defendant together with any
interest of the bankrupt estate in the fire policies covering
the respective interests of the owner and the lender under
the deed of trust, and the defendant acquired the policies
by assignment. All this may be regarded as the equivalent
of a foreclosure of the trust deed. Thereafter defendant
received insurance monies which included an undetermined
sum for the clean-up. Plaintiff was now in the position of
having no practically enforceable claim against the owner,
and no lien against the premises. He therefore sued for unjust
enrichment. The defendant correctly pointed out that there
was a complete lack of privity between it and the plaintiff,
and that there was no fraud or mistake involved. The court
agreed that the plaintiff could not assert any claim of lien
against the insurance funds similar to that allowed a materialman who has relied upon a loan fund for reimbursement,l1
but held, nevertheless, that plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement from the defendant to the extent defendant received
insurance monies in compensation for work already done by
the plaintiff. The court said:
We are cited no California cases that are close aboard,
and independent research reveals none. Lack of precedent applicable to the facts peculiar to this case is not
surprising, however, as the authors of the Restatement
recognize that the essential nature of equity cases concerned with problems of restitution makes definitive
precedent unlikely. We are guided by the "Underlying
Principles" delineated in the Restatement. 12
Thus, as in the case involving the French farmer, the plaintiff,
who had a valid though uncollectible contract claim against
11. This rule has been more fully
stated in Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty
Savings and Loan Ass'n., 254 Cal. App.
2d - , 60 Cal Rptr. 94 (1967). The
materialman is given an equitable lien
on proceeds of foreclosure of the security for a construction loan when he has

been induced to rely on the fund for
payment. Unjust enrichment may exist
even though construction is incomplete
at the time of foreclosure.
12. 254 Cal. App.2d at 697-698, 62
Cal. Rptr. at 227.
CAL LAW 1967
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one person, was given a restitutionary claim against a third
person to whom a benefit of the contract could be traced on
only the broadest of principles, which principles nonetheless
appear to be multi-national in application.
Certain unanswered questions are raised by the Kossian
decision. Could the insurer have declined payment because
the insured had sustained no loss? If the plaintiff held an
unsatisfied judgment against the owner in a contract action,
could he have sued the insurer directly for reimbursement
under the coverage for the clean-up if settlement had not
otherwise been made? The decision invites comparison with
Allen v. Powell,13 in which a real estate broker, who had negotiated a lease, was left with a claim for a commission of
$60,000 against insolvent parties because of the alleged tortious action of the defendant-lessee in conspiring with the
lessor to interfere with the broker's contractual right to collect
the listed commission. The defendant-lessee had made separate arrangements to pay rent directly to creditors of the financially troubled lessors, and apparently obtained thereby some
concessions against the rent to be paid. The complaint set
forth a tort count, and a count for "unjust enrichment" in
that defendant "by its said collusive action procured said land
at a sum which was less than the fair market value thereof
by the amount of the plaintiff's $60,000 commission."14 The
court held that the second count stated neither a cause of
action for a constructive trust (there being an adequate legal
remedy for tort damages), nor for quasi-contract recovery
based on a waiver of the tort. For the latter remedy, said
the court:
"[T]here must be something moving to the defendant to
support the implied promise to pay therefor. . . . Plaintiffs
must simply rely on the tort."15 Conceptually, the Allen
decision seems rather more doctrinaire than Kossian.
Although the California courts are willing to use restitution
for unjust enrichment, they are not necessarily above misusing
13.
Rptr.
14.
Rptr.
288
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248 Cal. App.2d 502, 56 Cal.
715 (1967).
248 Cal. App.2d at 509, 56 Cal.
at 720.

15. 248 Cal. App.2d at 510, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 721.
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it. In Palmer v. Gregg,16 an action in quantum meruit had
been filed against the estate of the decedent, the plaintiff
alleging the rendition of services to decedent before his death
"with the expectation on the part of both . . . that plaintiff
would be compensated therefor.»l7 On appeal the Supreme
Court eliminated certain items on the basis that they were
not of direct benefit to the decedent and could not be recovered in quantum meruit. It is almost embarrassing to suggest
that the Supreme Court has here confused contract and quasicontract, and that, as stated, the problem was whether the
questioned services were included in the contract, and not
whether there was benefit.
Another seeming misapplication of restitutionary remedies
appears in the case of Thompson v. Price. 1s Defendant Price
and his wife took half the shares in the J. A. C. Corporation
and Thompson took the other half. After being entrusted
with management, Price allegedly violated most of the fiduciary duties listed in standard corporate texts, including diversion of corporate opportunities and the withdrawal, in the
form of improper salaries and fees, of more than he had invested. On behalf of themselves and the corporation, the
plaintiffs sought to have a constructive trust declared in Price's
shares, which remedy the trial court denied. The appellate
court reversed, holding that, by withdrawing more than he
had put in, Price had put the total risk of the corporation on
Thompson; therefore, the corporate investments thereafter
made were really Thompson's investments and thus Price, in
his position as shareholder, would be unjustly enriched. Whatever the merits as between the parties, this equitable restitutionary remedy of a constructive trust appears inappropriately
applied, since the shares were not originally acquired in any
improper fashion. The court is simply causing them to be
forfeited because of personal and corporate claims.
16. 65 Cal.2d 657, 56 Cal. Rptr. 97,
422 P.2d 985 (1967).
17. 65 Cal.2d at 660, 56 Cal. Rptr.
at 98, 422 P.2d at 986.

lSI.
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Equitable Jurisdiction and Remedies in General-as Distinguished from Equitable Jurisdiction
Erroneous exercise of equitable jurisdiction is usually tested
by appeal, whereas void orders issued in the absence of primary jurisdiction or in obvious and gross excess of equitable
jurisdiction are subject to immediate attack by extraordinary
writ. An application of these principles appears in United
Farm Workers Organizing Committee v. Superior Court/ 9
wherein prohibition rather than appeal was held to be the
proper recourse against a lower court injunction decree, alleged and found to be unconstitutional.
Maintenance of Litigational Status-Preliminary Injunctions
A mandatory temporary injunction to pay over money
would seem to be peculiarly vulnerable under routine equity
principles, but such an order was sustained on appeal in Fretz
v. Burke,20 in what was basically a partnership accounting
suit. Upon service of summons and complaint, the defendant
had begun placing the plaintiff's share of profits, $5,000 per
month, in a "suspense account"; the account had reached the
sum of $35,000. The defendant's explanation was that the
sums might be needed to reimburse him for costs and expenses
in conjunction with the current litigation, a wholly baseless
excuse. The trial court issued a preliminary order to pay
over the retained profits with $5,000 to be placed in trust,
and to pay over future shares to which plaintiff might become
entitled. This was affirmed on appeal. Defendant's main
objections and the court's answers thereto may be summarized
as follows:
( 1) A temporary decree should not issue to correct past
actions, but only future actions. The court pointed out that
here there was a plain intent to continue.
(2) This was a mandatory decree and improper at the
interlocutory stage. While it is true such decrees are uncommon, the status quo here was in fact a state of action,
monthly payments, which the defendant had interrupted.
19. 254 Cal. App.2d 841, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 567 (1967).
290
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(3) The decree was for the payment of money, and therefore unenforceable by the usual civil contempt proceedings
of equity. The court recognized that this case was an exception in that it was the payment of a fund held by a fiduciary,
and not an indebtedness.
(4) No irreparable injury was shown. The court said
that, regardless, the defendant's action might be properly
considered as "insufferable" and an overbearing assumption
of superiority and domination over the rights of others. It
must be admitted that the California courts' attitude as to
this element of equitable jurisdiction adds a new dimension
to the law.
(5) A court may not enjoin a breach with respect to a
contract that cannot be specifically enforced. [Apparently
this contention had reference to the lack of equitable jurisdiction to control a partnership by decree.] The court, however,
noted that this was an accounting rather than a specific performance suit.

Overall the decision represents a proper discretionary application of equitable doctrines in exceptional circumstances.
It might be noted that no reference was made to the holdings
in California that mandatory temporary orders are subject
to stay on appeal. 1
Declaratory Judgments
The declaratory judgment is an extension of the equitable
bill quia timet and, although statutory, is subject to equitable
principles. The widespread practice of using the declaratory
judgment device to obtain calendar priority in inapposite situations received a setback in Travers v. Louden. 2 The complaint merely sought a declaration as to whether defendant
had broken a contract. No other remedy was sought. Summary judgment against the plaintiff was affirmed. The court
observed that the rights of the parties "had crystallized into
a cause of action for past wrongs.,,3
1. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Davis, 228 Cal. App.2d 827, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 791 (1964).

2. 254 Cal. App.2d 1044, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 654 (1967).
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 1047, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 656.
CAL LAW 1967
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The declaratory judgment is becoming a routine remedy
to test the constitutionality of penal ordinances, and its availability is normally not even seriously questioned. 4 As an
extension of the equitable remedy of injunction against oppressive government actions (with which it is frequently
combined), the declaratory judgment is made subject to traditional criteria for equitable jurisdiction in this type of case,
with the result that its exercise is erratic. Perhaps this reflects
some reservations as to whether equitable jurisdiction should
be confined to declaring a penal ordinance unconstitutional,
as such, or should be expanded to determine whether a person
is exposed to a possible unconstitutional application of a penal
statute as to him.
In one case in point, the California Water and Telephone
Company challenged the constitutionality of a Los Angeles
County ordinance related to procedures attendant upon the
installation of a water supply system to subdivisions. 5 The
impact of the ordinance was quite remote, as there was no
prosecution or threat of prosecution at the time. After considerable discussion it was held that constitutional questions
could be decided through a declaratory judgment, but that a
concomitant injunction would be dissolved as being needless
under the circumstances. Two prior cases (which technically
antedate the temporal scope of this article) showed an
ambivalence toward the remedy. In Manchel v. County of
Los Angeles6 an injunction (in conjunction with a declaratory
judgment suit) against the enforcement of an ordinance
against playing the game of "pan" was struck down on appeal
on the grounds that there was no issue of unconstitutionality
of the ordinance, no deprivation of a property right leading
to irreparable injury was shown, and injunctions against criminal prosecutions will not ordinarily be issued in suits for
declaratory relief. On the other hand, in Landau v. Fording7
4. See, e.g., La Franchi v. City of
Santa Rosa, 8 Ca1.2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301,
110 ALR 639 (1937).
5. Cal. Water & Telephone Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App.2d
11, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1967).
292
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18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 87 S.Ct. 2109 (1967);
the dicta implying that "pandering" is
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a declaratory judgment was issued that the film ("Un Chant
d'Amour") was obscene. Plaintiff had been threatened with
arrest by the Berkeley Police Department. Nothing was said
about the propriety of the proceedings or as to exactly what
effect the decree would have in the event a criminal action
were to follow.
Remedies for Injuries to Tangible Property Interests

Trespass-Damages

We are reminded, in Costerisan v. Tejon Ranch Company,S
that "damage" is a substantive element of the tort of trespass,
so a jury finding of a trespass without damage is a nUllity.
Nominal damages, however, should have sufficed to validate
the verdict. This seemingly trivial point acquires greater
magnitude when its relevance to assessment for costs is considered.
The measure of damages against innocent trespassers who
remove a portion of the freehold is reviewed again in the
third appeal in prolonged litigation-the case now has the
title of Bates v. Smith. 9 Defendants had in good faith mined
4,663 tons of gypsite from the plaintiff's holdings and sold
the mineral after some processing. There was no profit;
indeed, a loss from the operation was indicated. On a previous appeal, the court had directed that the damages should
be measured by the value of the mineral in situ by determining
"reasonable market value" less the reasonable cost of transportation and cost of milling and mining. Thereupon the trial
court determined the market value at $3.50 per ton and
subtracted $1.10 per ton for delivery costs, which would give
a value of $2.40 per ton at the mine head. This was raised
to $2.50 on an allowance for upgrading the particular mineral
because of its percentage rating of gypsite content. The trial
a part of the offense proscribed by
Penal Code § 311.2 was specifically
overruled in People v. Noroff, 67 Cal.2d
814, 63 Cal. Rptr, 575, 433 P.2d 479
(1967) . For further discussion of this
case see Leahy, Constitutional Law, in
this volume.

8. 255 Cal. App.2d 77, 62 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1967).
9. 246 Cal. App.2d 357, 54 Cal. Rptr.
624 (1966).
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court then determined the "reasonable" cost for milling and
mining, partial screening, and for road-building expense at
$1.22 per ton. Thus, $2.50 less $1.22 times 4,663 tons
equals $5,968.64 damages. Defendants now urged that the
actual costs of mining and milling should have been offset
against the value at the pit head, pointing out that the word
"reasonable" had not been used in the prior opinion relative
to mining and milling costs. The appellate court rejected this
contention, noting that holding otherwise would allow the
unskillful or improvident innocent trespasser to escape all
damage liability. Such a result would hardly be proper compensation to an owner who has had 4,663 tons of gypsite
stripped from his land.
The rules as to measuring damages for trespass for removal
of ore were also reviewed in Whittaker v. OttdO without reference to the Bates decision. In this case the court protected
the purchaser of the ore on the theory that personal property
produced from real property by the efforts of an innocent
trespasser becomes marketable-an apparent extension of the
property doctrine of "accession."
Trespass-Injunction against Encroachments

A private injunction against utility companies is difficult
because of the probable intervention of a public use. In a
quiet title-injunction suit, Slemons v. Southern California Edison CO.,!l brought on by the installation of three power poles
on plaintiff's land, a decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on
the ground that the taking must be for a substantial public
use. The availability of an alternate route is thus a factor
in the landowner's favor.
Personal Property-Negligent Injuries-Damages

The owner of a damaged automobile is entitled to the cost
of repairs plus loss-of-use value until repaired, or to the value
of the automobile in the case of total destruction plus loss-ofuse value (under certain circumstances) until replaced. In
10. 248 Cal. App.2d 666, 56 Ca1.
Rptr. 836 (1967).
294
CAL LAW 1967

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/13

11. 252 Cal. App.2d 1088, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 785 (1967).

12

York: Remedies

Remedies

Owens v. Pyeatt/ 2 the insurer, Allstate, undertook repairs
which were unsatisfactory to the owner, and the latter declined
to sign a proffered release (which Allstate, by the terms of
the policy, was not entitled to demand). Inasmuch as the
repairs were not appropriate, plaintiff lost the use of the car
for twenty-nine months, for which the trial court allowed
$1,250 damages. The appellate court held that this award
was too low where there had been a clear showing that the
loss of use in terms of minimum rental for twenty-nine months
exceeded $3,000, even with generous allowance for depreciation, etc.

Remedies for Personal Injuries
Wrongful Death Damages-Adequacy

A new trial on the sole issue of damages was granted in
Haskins v. Holmes. I3 Plaintiff had sustained a fractured
cheek and jaw requiring surgery. In a nonjury trial, $1,000
damages were awarded of which $911.37 were ascribed to
special damages for medical and similar costs, leaving only
$88.63 for general damages. This the appellate court regarded as obviously inadequate for the pain, suffering, and
inconvenience manifestly incurred. Likewise a new trial
limited to the damage issue was ordered in Doyle v. Hamren,t4
a wrongful death case, where the decedent had a 44-year life
expectancy and a wife and child, and had earned a substantial
income while in school. The appellate court estimated that
annual earnings of $5,000 for 40 years would have a present
value of $98,965-a minimal estimation of damages and yet
grossly in excess of the $50,000 verdict. By comparison, a
mere $30,000 wrongful death award was affirmed in Syah
v. Johnson/5 where the decedent had a wife and two minor
daughters and a life expectancy of 30 years. The deceased
in this instance was a penniless paroled convict and a compulsive gambler who had abandoned his wife and taken their
12.
Rptr.
13.
Rptr.
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100 (1967).
252 Cal. App.2d 580, 60 Cal.
659 (1967).

14. 246 Cal. App.2d 733, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 84 (1966).
15. 247 Cal. App.2d 534, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 741 (1966).
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small savings with him. However, the evidence indicated
that between gambling episodes the deceased displayed
some affection for his family and had earned up to $100 per
week before being sent to the penitentiary.
In two personal injury cases, Gallentine v. Richardson16 and
Buniger v. Buniger/7 new trials on all issues were directed
because the inadequacy of the verdicts indicated that the
respective juries were divided as to liability. The decision
in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company,18 permitting additur in
California, should affect the volume of appellate decisions
involving retrials on the issue of damages.
Damages-Punitive

Products liability cases are usually directed at solvent corporations, and in addition to sizeable personal injury awards,
punitive damages of major proportions may be imposed. A
concerted, but unsuccessful, attack upon the allowance of
such recoveries was made in Toole v. Richardson-Merrel,
Inc. /9 where a verdict of $175,000 general damages and
$500,000 punitive damages was reduced to $250,000 and,
thus reduced, affirmed. Specifically, the objections were
directed to the propriety of punitive damages against corporations (which awards, as critics have emphasized, are borne
by many shareholders who are in no position to control management); that the required "malice in fact" was not (and
perhaps could not be) shown; and that punitive damages are in
fact unconstitutional.
Remedies for Deception
As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this article,
deceptive practices in bargaining transactions are wrongs for
which the offended party may be given substantive law choices
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 152, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 237 (1967).
17. 249 Cal. App.2d 50, 57 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1967).
18. 66 Cal.2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276,
427 P.2d 988 (1967).
296
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Rptr. 398 (1967), and on denial of rehearing 251 Cal. App.2d at 718, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 418 (1967).
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between tort, contract, or restitution. Remedial possibilities
may affect the election.
Damages
A promise made without intent to perform may, upon nonperformance, be treated as breach of contract, or as the commission of common-law deceit. The latter remedy affords
recovery of all damages proximately caused, whether or not
within the contemplation of the parties, and also punitive
damages. These remedial advantages probably influenced
the plaintiff's choice in two recent cases. In Wilkenson v.
Linnecke,20 the defendant promised (without intent to perform) to obtain security for a loan of $10,000 advanced by
the plaintiff to a third party. The loan was uncollectible, and
in a tort action, damages to the amount of the loan plus
$1,000 punitive damages were awarded and affirmed on appeal. The other case, Brockway v. Heilman/ involved the
sale of a cafe, bar, and liquor license, with $22,000 of the
price being allocated to the property and $20,000 to the
liquor license. The plaintiff buyer, received only the property, although he paid $7,358.88 in excess of $22,000. The
"eller committed actionable fraud in that he had no intent
at the time of making the contract to deliver the liquor license.
A judgment in a tort action for $7,358.58 plus $5,000 punitive
damages was affirmed on appeal, the court holding this to
be a proper application of section 3343 of the Civil Code2
(out-of-pocket rule), with dicta to the effect that section 3343
is not the exclusive remedy. Under the circumstances, a
question might be raised as to possible advantages in electing
the alternative remedy for breach of contract.
20. 251 Cal. App.2d 291, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 290 (1967).
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 807, 58 Cal. Rptr.
772 (1967).
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 3343. Damages
for fraud in pnrchase, sale or exchange
of property.
One defrauded in the purchase, sale
or exchange of property is entitled to
recover the difference between the actual
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value of that with which the defrauded
person parted and the actual value of
that which he received, together with
any additional damage arising from the
particular transaction.
Nothing herein contained shall be
deemed to deny to any person having a
cause of action for fraud or deceit any
legal or equitable remedies to which
such person may be entitled.
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Damages-Collateral Source
The Souza & McCue Construction Co. held a contract for
the construction of a sewer line for the City of Salinas. Because of the latter's deceit (by active concealment) as to soil
conditions which affected the bid, Souza secured a $124,100
judgment for damages, calculated as the difference between
the fair and reasonable cost of the actual performance and
the cost of performing the work in the absence of misrepresentation. To the reasonable value of the services and materials, the trial court added 10 percent as compensation for
indirect overhead, plus 15 percent of total as compensation
for the profit to which the contractor was deemed to be entitled. The supreme court found no fault with this formula
for measuring compensatory damages. 3
However, Souza had had collateral dealings with Armco,
the supplier of pipe for the job, whereby the latter had guaranteed performance of the piping and had promised to indemnify Souza for any loss. The city offered evidence as to an
alleged compromise agreement between Armco and Souza.
That agreement, claimed the city, compensated Souza in
whole, or in part, for the city's "breach." This evidence was
excluded by the trial court, and, because of this, the case was
reversed.
The issue raised was concerned with the "collateral source"
doctrine. The Supreme Court reviewed the doctrine generally
and held that, to the extent it was designed to exclude the
benefits of collateral sources of compensation in calculating
a tortfeasor's liability in damages, it is punitive in nature.
On this assumption the doctrine would have no applicability
when a government entity, free from punitive liability, was
the tortfeasor; hence other sources of compensation (even
contractual claims for indemnity) could be shown to exist.
The implication of this potentially important decision is that
the government, though liable in tort, is in effect entitled to
the benefit of the injured party's insurance.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/13

3. City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue
Construction Co. Inc., 66 Ca1.2d 217,
57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967).
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Damages plus Injunction
A rather unusual combination of remedies for deceit was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Green Trees Enterprises,
Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.,4 wherein a tort
action for deceit by a grantee of realty resulted in a judgment
for punitive damages and a reduction of the purchase price.
As a further remedy, the court granted a temporary injunction
against foreclosing an outstanding trust deed (which was still
less than the judicially reduced price) because the gestures
toward foreclosure interfered with plaintiff's attempts to dispose of the property. A decree extending the temporary order
was the subject of the appeal to the California Supreme Court.

Rescission: Mechanics of -Punitive Damages-More
Election Problems
The defrauded party may, of course, elect to disaffirm the
bargain and seek restitution-legal or equitable. Sections
1691-1693 of the Civil Code were passed in 1961 purporting
to create but a single action "based on rescission" and to
eliminate prior distinctions between legal and equitable rescission. The failure to mention the statutes in some cases may
suggest that the distinctions supposedly eliminated lie deeper
than the statutes' cut. For example, Efron v. Kalmanovitz 5
involved a derivative suit by a corporate shareholder relating
to a sale of assets by the corporation to another corporation
wholly owned by the seller's dominant shareholder. Restitution and appropriate equitable relief by way of a constructive
trust, equitable lien, or money payment (depending on how
far tracing could be had) was decreed. The defendant's
objection to the form of the decree, that rescission of the contract was not expressly adjudged, was properly overruled by
the court. This was an equity decree effecting restitution by
its own operation. Nothing was said about the statutory
"action based upon a rescission" which would have been illadapted to the situation at hand.
4. 66 Cal.2d 782, 59 Cal. Rptr. 141,
427 P.2d 805 (1967).
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Joinder of counts for deceit and for restitution are permissible, subject to the ultimately required election. Thus, in
Klein v. Benaron,6 the defendant, president of the Gamble
Ranch Investment Company, a Nevada corporation, obtained
$50,500 from plaintiff, giving in exchange a promissory note,
stock in the company, and a false promise to use the money
to buy additional land. Plaintiff sued for deceit plus punitive damages and appended a common count to the complaint.
In connection with the latter count, attachment was had which
was dissolved by order of the Superior Court. This order
was reversed on appeal in a holding which seems quite correct.
The plaintiff had restored everything of value, so the case
resolves into a classic example of rescission in pais (rescission
at law, out-of-court rescission, disaffirmance, or other variant
expressions) followed by a quasi-contractual action for restitution in conjunction with which an attachment is proper. The
California rescission statutes were not mentioned, but
there is nothing in the decision incompatible therewith. On
the election point, the appellate court noted in its reversal
that there may well be an election which would result not from
the mere joinder of counts of deceit and quasi-contract, but
from the restoration of benefits by the plaintiff, indicating an
intent and attempt to rescind, coupled with the detriment
caused by the attachment. The court also indicated that such
an election might terminate the claim for exemplary damages.
On this last point-whether rescission plus punitive damages is permissible-the recent California cases are in conflict. In addition to the statement in Klein, there is similar
dictum in Brockway v. Heilman that rescission precludes
punitive damages. 7 The court gives as authority for this position Crogan v. Metz,8 although the Crogan case is one for
the recovery of secret profits from an agent, not for rescission.
On the other hand, in Millar v. James,9 in which a conveyance of realty was obtained by fraud of the grantee, the
6. 247 Cal. App.2d 607, 56 Cal. Rptr.
5 (1967).
7. 250 Cal. App.2d 807, 58 Cal. Rptr.
772 (1967).
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grantor obtained a decree cancelling the deed and quieting
his title, and a monetary award for loss of use. It was held
that plaintiff could also obtain punitive damages as well as
rescission, citing Topanga Corp. v. Gentile. 10 In the latter
case, restitution plus punitive damages was ordered in favor
of a corporation against a promoter in a fraud case. Ward
v. Taggert ll was cited.
Although the holding in Millar v. James is unequivocal,
its lineage is suspect. Ward v. Taggert may lend itself to
the construction that both restitution and punitive damages
may be had, but Ward v. Taggert was not a rescission case
and no election between substantive rights was involved. In
any event, some clarification is urgently needed.
One other 1967 case involving an election problem did
refer to section 1693 of the Civil Code. That section sanctions the joinder of a claim for tort damages based on affirmance with a claim based on rescission. The inexorable
election between the two must still be made, and if mishandled
can lead to a loss of all remedies. In Doctor v. Lakeridge
Construction CO.,t2 the plaintiff, a land developer, bought a
vacant lot and claimed a misrepresentation as to land conditions affecting building possibilities. An action for damages was filed in July, 1963, but no mention of rescission was
made until the pretrial statement in February, 1966. The
fraud claim was lost for want of proof of the substantive elements of the tort of deceit, which might not have been required
for rescission had the right of election been held open. But not
acting promptly to rescind, the plaintiff had elected to affirm
and was remedially bound by the choice.
Remedies for Duress, Undue Influence, Etc.
In the absence of a defined tort of duress or undue influence, remedial possibilities are confined to rescission or
cancellation of transactions induced thereby. In Odorizzi v.
10. 249 Cal. App.2d 681, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1967).
11. 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P2d 534
(1959).

12. 252 Cal. App.2d 778, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 824 (1967).
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Bloomfield School District,I3 the plaintiff, a schoolteacher,

had been booked by the police on charges of homosexuality
and released on bail. Emotionally and mentally upset and
sleepless for forty hours, he retired to his apartment, where
he was met by school authorities who advised him to resign
to avoid publicity, or otherwise face suspension and dismissal
with the attendant notoriety. He resigned and then brought
suit for declaratory relief which, in effect, requested the court
to rescind his resignation pursuant to section 1689 of the
Civil Code. The thrust of plaintiff's allegations was that he
had trust and confidence in the representations of the school
authorities so that they were able to substitute their will and
judgment for his own and cause him to submit a resignation.
A demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend was
sustained. On appeal, the court held that neither fraud nor
mistake was pleaded in the complaint. Further, neither common-law duress nor menace was pleaded because the only
threat was to take such legal proceedings as was the duty of
the officials to bring, and this was in no sense unlawful if
done in good faith. Parenthetically, it could have been added
that the concept of common-law duress requires that the
defendant originate the coercion operative upon the plaintiff's will and, apart from the good-faith threats to institute
proceedings, the defendant and its agents were not responsible
for the pressures bearing upon the plaintiff. This eliminated
all grounds for rescission as mentioned in section 1689 except
"undue influence," and on this ground the lower court was
reversed. In contrast to "legal" duress, undue influence is a
concept of equitable origin, characteristically applied to
abuses of the inherent influence possessed by one in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another. Undue influence
has been given an expanded definition in section 1575 of
the Civil Code, subsection (2), as "taking an unfair advantage
of another's weakness of mind", and in subsection (3) as
"taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's
necessities or distress." In none of these variations is there
13. 246 Cal. App.2d 123, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 533 (1966).
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the requirement-so important for common-law duress-that
the defendant be responsible for the plaintiff's difficult position. The appellate court in Odorizzi concluded that a cause
of action for rescission was stated under both subsections
1575 (2) and (3). An extended discussion of the case need
not be undertaken here, because of the probable ad hoc application of the considerations elaborated upon. Let it be said
that section 1575 (3) appears to be more a generalized codification of the broad equitable notion of "unconscionability"
than a specific variety of "undue influence." If this inference
is correct, there is little likelihood that the provisions of
section 1575 (3) will be given application much beyond situations such as the Odorizzi case, particularly where regular
commercial transactions might be concerned. There is little
in the history of section 1575 (3) to show such extension
despite the elasticity of the language, and Odorizzi relies almost exclusively on precedents from testamentary dispositions
and confidential relationships between persons with notable
disparities in ability. California did not adopt the unconscionability provisions of article 2, section 302, of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and although a distinct doctrine of "business compulsion" seems to be evolving, the concept of "undue
influence," even as expanded by statute, has not had as much
influence as might be expected in this state.
Odorizzi leaves unanswered the question of whether a jury
trial would be a matter of right on the issues raised in pursuing this essentially equitable relief.
Remedies for Mistake
Mistake in Non-Bargaining Transactions
The collapse of a subdivision project resulted in an interesting and perhaps important decision in which the equitable restitutionary remedy of a lien was used to save a lending
institution from a peculiarly egregious error. In this case,
Jones v. Sacramento Savings & Loan Association,14 a group
of purchase money trust deeds securing loans of $806.45 per
14. 248 Cal. App.2d 522, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 741 (1967). For further discus-

sion, see McIntosh, Real Property, in
this volume.
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Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

303

21

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 13

Remedies

lot, all drafted to permit subordination in favor of the anticipated construction loans, were outstanding. Some time
later, Sacramento Savings & Loan Association advanced construction monies secured by trust deeds amounting to $11,000
to $12,000 per lot and the monies were indeed used for inprovements. Sacramento Savings intended that the purchase money
trust deeds would be subordinated, but through inadvertence
this was not accomplished. Jones acquired (at a discount) the
purchase money trust deeds which fortuitously had priority.
Upon default, both Jones and Sacramento Savings took separate foreclosure measures, and the trustees' sales of various
houses and lots took place more or less contemporaneously,
and in some cases overlapped. No sale produced a bid in
excess of the secured debt of the particular beneficiary. As
the appellate court described it:
The sales to Jones in enforcement of the senior liens
wiped out the junior liens of Sacramento Savings. . . .
In those cases where Jones' trustee was the first to give
notices and hold sales, the subsequent sales on behalf
of Sacramento Savings conveyed no title to Sacramento
Savings and succeeded only in clouding Jones' title.
Where Sacramento Savings' trustee was the
first to give notices and hold sales, Sacramento Savings
purchased title subordinate to the senior liens of [Jones].15
J ones, perhaps feeling overly secure, filed this suit to quiet
title, presumably to facilitate the marketability of the houses
(or at least some of them) at retail, and the trial court ruled
in his favor.
The position of Sacramento Savings was, of course, analogous to that of one who mistakenly improves the property
of another, except that it had provided the money for the
improvements instead of the improvements themselves. The
legal position of the mistaken improver of the land of another
is not a comfortable one. "Betterment Statutes" may allow
removal of the improvements (hardly a solution here) and

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/13
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otherwise provide remedies by offset against claims by the
owner rather than affirmative remedies. For example, section
741 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relied upon by Jones,
allows a mistaken trespasser to offset the value of improvements only against damages when such are claimed in an
ejectment action.
The appellate court, however, reversed the ruling in favor
of Jones and directed equitable liens on the various parcels
in favor of Sacramento Savings to prevent unjust enrichment.
The exact terms of the liens were left flexible within the discretion of the trial court, depending upon further developments as to marketing of the homes. Immediate foreclosure
of the liens was definitely not suggested. Neither prior nor
post-judgment interest was awarded as part of the liens.
The decision here is a commendable utilization of equitable
principles and remedies. The court properly rejected section
741 of the Code of Civil Procedure as inapplicable. The
suit to quiet title is equitable and the decision is no more
than an application of the maxim: "He who seeks equity,
must do equity." The equitable lien imposed no personal
obligation on Jones, as would a money judgment for restitution, so the argument against "improving the owner out
of his property" is a voided. Had Jones not sued to quiet
title, however, it is doubtful that there would have been any
affirmative restitutionary remedy available to Sacramento
Savings.
When a person mistakenly pays property taxes on the wrong
parcel, he has no common-law right of restitution from the
taxing authority in California. A statutory remedy is afforded
for, among other things, taxes "erroneously collected," but
this does not cover the payor's mistake. 16 If statutory restitution is sought, however, the action is said to be governed
by equitable principles. 17 The correlative question of restitution from the property owner whose premises were relieved
from the tax claim did not arise during the year.
16. Sierra Inv. Corp. v. County of
Sacramento, 252 Cal. App.2d 339, 60
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1967).
20
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Mistake as to Existence of a Contract: Restitution for
Services Rendered in Reliance
The person mistakenly performing services benefiting another is in much the same position as the mistaken improver
of another's property. Specific restitution is impossible and
a translation of his claim into one for money would place a
harsh burden upon the recipient of the services, who would
have to come up with money to pay for something, the value
of which may be dubious as well as intangible, for which he
would have struck no bargain. Restitution is not automatically accorded in all instances,18 and even when it is,
the quasi-contractual benefit is measured from the standpoint
of the recipient.
A special case obtains, however, when services are rendered
at the request of the defendant in connection with a "contract"
which never materializes-or, put another way, in misreliance
upon a nonexistent contract, but with the knowledge and at
the request of the recipient. A line of authority establishes
the measure of quasi-contractual recovery here in terms of
the reasonable value of the work, even though of no benefit
to the recipient. This is the gist of a dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Traynor in Coleman Engineering Company v.
North American A viation. 19 Since the case was decided in
terms of breach of an express contract, the opinion is technically no more than an augury for a future rule of restitution
when suitable litigation arises. There is nothing wrong with
this rule of measurement of quantum meruit recovery for mistake in special circumstances, but the disguise of reliance
damages in the language of restitution of benefits should fool
no one. Perhaps it is more important to preserve the legal
symmetry of contract law, than to worry about precision in
the much more unstructured rules of "unjust enrichment."
Mistakes in Integration

Whether or not a subdivider who has sold all the houses
is an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of section 3399
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;)f the Civil Code was one of the questions raised in a suit
to reform provisions with respect to access to a street within
the subdivision. The actual aggrieved party was the last
purchaser on a cul-de-sac street whose right of access was
challenged by earlier residents. To straighten out the situation required modifications of prior deeds to which the latecomer was not a party. The subdivider was allowed to
maintain the suit.20
Remedies for Breach of Contract
Contracts for the Sale of Land; Breach by BuyerDamages

The textbook equitable remedies available to the vendor
because of the purchaser's breach are in current disfavor in
California, what with such things as anti-deficiency legislation
as to instalment contracts and the general obstacle to specific
performance inherent in the Civil Code requirement that the
plaintiff establish that the consideration be adequate and the
bargain just and reasonable.!
On the other hand, there is doubt that the vendor will,
as a practical matter, very often be able to establish general
damages for the purchaser's failure to perform. According
to section 3307 of the Civil Code, the measure of damages
for breach of contract to purchase real property is the amount
by which the contract price exceeds the value of the property
to the seller on the date of breach. If the contract is an instalment one, and the breach delayed, the vendor might as
well forget it. If the contract is the usual down payment plus
a trust deed for the balance at close of escrow, the vendor's
claim for general damages is complicated by certain evidentiary difficulties. In Newhart v. Pierce,2 the plaintiffs
owned an operating cattle ranch in Nevada, which they contracted to sell in April, 1957, for $171,500 (this figure excludes the price of the livestock and certain other extraneous
and diverse consideration). The purchase price was to be
20. Shupe v. Nelson, 254 Cal. App.2d
744, 62 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
1. Cal. Civ. Code § 3391(1) and (2).

2. 254 Cal. App.2d 856, 62 Cal. Rptr.
553 (1967).
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secured by a trust deed. The close of escrow was extended
to July 1, 1957. The purchaser defaulted, and after eighteen
months the ranch was exchanged for other properties, which
the plaintiff in the present action for damages vaguely estimated as being worth $95,000. The plaintiff also gave his
opinion (or "guess") as to the value to him at the time of
breach as $150,000. The appellate court concluded that the
owner could competently testify as to value (since the statutory measure is based on a sUbjective standard, the rule
could hardly be otherwise), and that resale price is likewise
competent, if not conclusive, evidence. Nonetheless, the evidence was held insufficient to sustain the trial court's finding
that the value at the time of breach was $150,000.
Instead, the appellate court stated the rule that:
[W]here (a) the contract price is not excessive and (b)
there is no decline in the market before the resale date,
it follows that the contract price and the value on the
date of breach are the same. 3
Since plaintiff admitted the contract price was not excessive
and there was no indication of a general drop-off in land
values, there were no general damages sustained in the case.
It is to be noted that this formula places the vendor at some
disadvantage in the ordinary sale through escrow. The vendor, if directly confronted at trial, is not likely to admit that
the contract price was excessive, nor are land values likely to
drop appreciably during the normal period of escrow.
The vendor, in an executory land sale contract, is generally
precluded from suing to recover the purchase price in California, since he holds the security of a vendor's lien subject
to the restrictions of the anti-deficiency statute which cannot
be evaded by a purported waiver of the lien. If there is in
fact no security of any sort, however, the vendor may bring
an action on the purchase money note. Thus in Van Vleck
Realty v. Gaunt,4 an action was brought on a $15,000 note
given as part of the original purchase price and the plaintiff
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 865, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 560.
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was permitted recovery. The case is not ordinary. The property was conveyed on the security of a trust deed together with
the "unsecured" note. Upon default the premises were reconveyed in settlement, but the $15,000 note was excluded
from the settlement. Therefore, despite superficial appearances, the action here was on an absolutely unsecured note,
free from even the possible existence of the ephemeral
grantor's lien.
Breach by Vendor-Specific Performance
Cases in this category, decided within the past year, present
only the usual equitable problems. Specific performance was
denied in Loeb v. Wilson 5 because of inadequacy of consideration and unilateral mistake as to the nature of the
vendor's title. The decree also made the vendor immune to
incidental damages. In Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn
Estates, Inc.,6 the vendor breached by anticipatory repUdiation
in the form of a conveyance to another during escrow. A
decree for the purchaser was reversed for lack of a showing
that the plaintiff was able and willing to perform at the time
performance was due, rather than at the time of trial. A
breach by anticipatory repudiation is only an excuse for nontender of performance. The remand embodied a suggestion
to the trial court to consider, in the event plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance, the imposition of damages as
an alternative to the mere restitution of the money deposited
in escrow.
Specific performance was granted in Alfinito v. Sater,7 despite a barrage of defenses ranging from non-performance
of conditions to unclean hands.
Contracts for the Sale of Chattels: Breach of WarrantyDamages
For breach of warranty in connection with the sale of
tomato seeds, the court, in Klein v. Asgrow Seed Company,S
5. 253 Cal. App.2d 438, 61 Cal. Rptr.
377 (1967).
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 622, 63 Cal. Rptr.
518 (1967).
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609 (1966).
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held the measure of damages was the difference between the
reasonable market value of the crop actually produced and
the value of the theoretical crop had the warranty been complied with, less the necessary expenses of raising and selling.
This conclusion was based on former Civil Code section
1789 (6), but the court commented that it was also the
measure under the present Commercial Code section
2714(2).
Contracts for the Sale of Stocks: Breach by BuyerDamages
Sackett v. Spindler9 arose out of a contract to sell all outstanding shares of the corporation which owned the Santa
Clara Journal. The buyer repudiated. The appellate court
affirmed the measure of damages as the difference between
the contract price and the price obtained on a resale of the
shares a year later. It held that the Uniform Sales Act then
in effect did not apply to shares of stock, and that the general
damage statute in California did not (in cases other than the
sale of realty) compel rigid adherence to the rule of "sale
price less market value" at the time of breach. The absence
of a ready market for the shares justified the variant measure
here. The allowance of prejudgment interest by the lower
court was reversed.
Construction Contracts-Breach by Owner

In Alec Ferguson Electrical Contractors v. Integrated,
Inc./o the defendant breached by stopping progress payments.
In reversing and remanding for retrial, the appellate court
noted the anomaly in this state that the failure to make progress payments is not a total breach as would entitle the contractor to sue for damages, but is enough so that he may
rescind and recover in quasi-contract for part performance.
Yet, even for the latter remedy to be available, the failure
to make progress payments must be substantial. This means
9. 248 Cal. App.2d 220, 56 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1967).
310
CAL LAW 1967

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/13

10. 250 Cal. App.2d 287, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 503 (1967).

28

York: Remedies

Remedies

that the evaluation of available remedies is complicated by
three levels of contract breach.
Contract of Employment:
Damages-M itigation

Breach by Employer-

The discharged employee in Erler v. Five Points Motors l l
sued for the balance of the contracted compensation for the
unexpired term. The defendant entered a general denial.
The trial court excluded evidence both as to what plaintiff
had earned after the breach and as to what he might reasonably have earned with the exercise of reasonable diligence, on
the ground that matters in mitigation of damage should have
been affirmatively pleaded. The appellate court held that
the plaintiff, of course, has a duty to minimize damages. He
also has the duty of proving actual damages, and the amount
he actually earned after defendant's breach bears upon his
actual damage. Therefore evidence as to actual damages
can be introduced under a general denial. On the other hand,
what plaintiff might reasonably have earned (which the court
characterized as "true mitigation") is an affirmative matter
and is the proper subject of defensive pleading. All this
may help in distinguishing between three separate mattersavoidable consequences, minimization of damages, and mitigation of damages.
Breach of a Dealership Contract: Specific Performance

In Thayer Plymouth Center Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp.,12 the appellate court reversed a preliminary injunction against terminating plaintiffs' dealership. The reasons
given were the usual equitable ones: adequacy of damages,
a principal-agent relationship, and the difficulty of continuous
supervision of a contract calling for co-operation.
11. 249 Cal. App.2d 560, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 516 (1967).

12. 255 Cal. App.2d 337, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (1967).
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Remedies for Breach of Nominally Unenforceable Transactions
Transactions Unenforceable Because of the Lack of a
Writing; Oral Contracts to Devise Realty-QuasiSpecific Performance

The common problem of the oral promise to devise realty
in exchange for services during the "testator's" lifetime was
again presented in Riganti v. McElhinney.13 In this case,
specific performance was decreed although services were performed for only six years ("not the length but the breadth,"
says the court). The case is useful only as containing further
illustrations as to the type of services that will incline a decision in favor of specific performance for the property rather
than quasi-contract recovery for the services. The defendant
unsuccessfully advanced the unusual argument that plaintiff
could not obtain a decree here because the holder of an
equitable title cannot quiet title against the legal owner.
Conveyances on Oral Trust

In Adams v. Young,14 the usual remedy of a constructive
trust was decreed for breach of an oral promise to hold property in trust. The confidential relationship between the parties
sufficed for equitable jurisdiction. As per statute15 in California, the trust is constructed for the benefit of the person
who would otherwise have had the res rather than in favor
of the grantor's estate-a result which, as is often pointed
out, is precisely the same as if there were a trust indenture.
The evidentiary aspect of this case is of mild interest, as the
conveyance was made over fifty years ago and direct testimony, save for that of an 84-year-old woman of uncertain
memory, was unavailable. The statute of limitations, of
course, begins to run only upon repudiation of the "trust."
13. 248 Cal. App.2d 116, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 195 (1967).
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14. 255 Cal. App2d 177, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 877 (1967).
15. Cal. Civ. Code § 2224.
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Other Breaches by Fiduciaries
In a typical case of a diversion of a benefit by a real estate
agent who had title to property (as to which he was employed
to negotiate) taken in the name of his wife, the agent attempted to avoid liability for a constructive trust because
there was no memorandum in writing signed by the defendant
sufficient to satisfy the statute. The justice's initial paragraph
disposes of this defense to an equitable remedy:
[T]his is yet another case of the faithless agent attempting to hide his double-dealing behind the skirts of the
statute of frauds. But skirts are not as voluminous as
they once were nor the coverage of the statute as comprehensive as it was sometimes thought to be. Unshapely limbs and unsightly conduct alike are today
disclosed to public view, and both must risk the consequences of full exposure. 16
The statute of frauds does not apply to a case which is essentially in equity to impress a constructive trust.
Transactions Unenforceable Because of Illegality-Restitu.
tion
The general rule which allows no remedies in favor of
either party to an illegal transaction was quite properly applied in two cases during 1967-Pyle v. Shipman I7 (violation
of Corporate Securities Law) and Goldstein v. Enoch I8 (an
indirect attempt to obtain a share of profits from an illegal
transaction) .
The sale of stock without a permit is illegal, but usually
a buyer is allowed restitution because of the "not in pari
delicto" exception. The prohibitive statute is designed to
protect one of the parties (the plaintiff-buyer) in the transaction. This exception was applied in Maner v. Mydland. 19
The "not in pari delicto" exception was also invoked to
16. Gerhardt v. Weiss, 247 Cal. App.
2d 115, 55 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1966).
17. 251 Cal. App.2d 913, 60 Cal,
Rptr. 46 (1967).
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allow a small dairyman to recover illegal rebates from the
president of a large creamery.20 The rebates were made to
secure and retain so-called "Grade A contracts" for the sale
of his milk. Without such "Grade A contracts" it appeared
the plaintiff would be unable to make a financial success of
the business. The statute forbidding such rebates applied
literally to both producers and distributors, so the parties
were technically in pari delicto under the statute. However,
the court held that the exercise of economic coercion made
the plaintiff less at fault and allowed restitution.
An equitable balance between the policy against enforcing
illegal bargains and the policy against unjust enrichment was
reached in Hainey v. Narigon.l The defendant was a veteran
entitled to a G.!. loan for housing. The plaintiff, his brotherin-law, was not a veteran. In order to avoid the laws restricting the benefits of veterans' loans, a house was bought in
the defendant's name. The plaintiff, who was in possession,
made essentially all payments on the G.!. loan, plus other
outlays for twelve years. Plaintiff then sued for a declaration
of a resulting trust, which would obviously judicially effect
an illegal bargain. The defendant, on the other hand, would
be equally obviously enriched by taking advantage of a violation of a statute designed merely to afford him certain exclusive benefits. The trial court followed the general rule
and allowed the defense of illegality. On appeal the decision
was reversed and the plaintiff was given an equitable lien,
covering all payments, including interest, taxes, insurance,
and out-of-pocket expenses in making permanent improvements. He was, however, deprived of the title to the property and a sizeable increase in market value. Such a decree
is another creditable application of equitable principles and
remedies to mitigate a harsh rule of law. The law cannot very
well provide legal remedies for a bargain which the law says
is illegal, but equity should permit of adjustments to prevent
an enrichment unwarranted by the degree of illegality involved.
20. Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal.
App.2d 768, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967).
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